John Searle and Richard Swinburne on the Nature of the Problem of Free Will and its Relation with Consciousness

Abstract

The problem of free will is still an issue and in the classical literature we find two extremes; either humans have free will or they are determined to act. In the current debates over free will we find compatibilism as the best solution to the problem of free will but compatibilism reveals a hopeless result and turns out to be a mere rational twist to defend determinism. On the other hand, naturalism’s metaphysical thesis of ‘physical causal closure’ also defends determinism. Current philosophical literature reveals the compliance of the analytic philosophers with naturalism to a great extent. Thus the problem of free will is discussed deterministically in the current neurophysiological theories. It is suggested that the problem of free will can be resolved only if the problem of consciousness is taken into account. John Searle complies with naturalism and defends his doctrine of biological naturalism and endorses the scientific explanation of consciousness. Richard Swinburne defends substance dualism as he also endorses the evolutionary notion of naturalism while discussing the emergence of consciousness. Both philosophers present different views about the problems of free will and consciousness. This article concludes that Searle’s notion of free will does not cohere with his view of consciousness due to his compliance with naturalism’s physical causal closure. Swinburne’s ‘personal explanation’ is plausible to address the problems of free will and its relation to consciousness.