Universally Composable Security
- 16 September 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Journal of the ACM
- Vol. 67 (5), 1-94
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3402457
Abstract
This work presents a general framework for describing cryptographic protocols and analyzing their security. The framework allows specifying the security requirements of practically any cryptographic task in a unified and systematic way. Furthermore, in this framework the security of protocols is preserved under a general composition operation, called universal composition. The proposed framework with its security-preserving composition operation allows for modular design and analysis of complex cryptographic protocols from simpler building blocks. Moreover, within this framework, protocols are guaranteed to maintain their security in any context, even in the presence of an unbounded number of arbitrary protocol sessions that run concurrently in an adversarially controlled manner. This is a useful guarantee, which allows arguing about the security of cryptographic protocols in complex and unpredictable environments such as modern communication networks.Keywords
Funding Information
- National Science Foundation (1801564, 1414119)
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