Top institutional investors and accounting comparability
Open Access
- 29 June 2021
- journal article
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Ownership and Control
- Vol. 18 (4), 42-66
- https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv18i4art4
Abstract
This study examines the relation between firm pair’s sharing of a top institutional investor (i.e., an institutional investor with the largest shareholding) and accounting comparability. Using data from Compustat, CRSP, and Thompson Reuters over the 1993–2017 period, the study finds that firm pairs that share the top institutional investor exhibit higher accounting comparability than other firm pairs. In addition, firm pairs whose top institutional investors are monitoring institutions (regardless of whether they are the same institutions) exhibit greater comparability than other firm pairs whose top institutional investors are non-monitoring institutions. Collectively, the study contributes to existing research on accounting comparability and large institutional investors by showing that the sharing of top institutional investors is an important determinant of accounting comparabilityKeywords
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