Shareholder composition, corporate governance and their monitoring effects on firm performance
Open Access
- 17 February 2020
- journal article
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Ownership and Control
- Vol. 17 (2), 165-182
- https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i2art14
Abstract
The main goal of the paper is to understand if the shareholder composition must be considered as a part of the corporate governance framework or as a monitoring factor, only. A related goal of the paper is to investigate if the shareholder composition is part of the loop connecting corporate governance and corporate performance. We analyze a sample made of 10,520 firms over the years 2006-2015, in 8 European countries having very differentiated governance frameworks, shareholder composition and corporate performance. The paper gives new insights to the current debate on the relations between governance and performance as well as the one on the components of the corporate governance framework. According to our evidence, governance contributes to corporate value by reducing agency in funding, rather than having an impact over returns. Moreover, we give evidence that corporate governance should be considered as a tool contributing to the efficacy of monitoring capabilities of the shareholder composition of equity, but no clear evidence is about the composition of equity to be considered as part of the corporate governance framework.Keywords
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