This study aims to highlight the importance of protecting investors’ rights, and particularly those of minority shareholders. This study addresses the predominant control-ownership structure of the top 100 firms listed in Bursa Istanbul (BI) using the data for 2015. It shows the most common control-ownership structure within business groups, in which shareholders exercise control over a group of firms and maintain a small stake of firms’ equities. Turkish firms are categorised with highly concentrated ownership and families’ being the dominant shareholders owning more than 80% of all publically listed firms in BI. The study results indicate that the divergence between cash rights and control rights (wedge)in the top 100 Turkish firms is mainly achieved through pyramidal-ownership structure, dual class shares, and cross-ownership at about 41%, 40% and 11%, respectively, while approximately 8% of firms do not use wedge. Hence, wedge exacerbates Type II Agency Problems. This paper calls for future research to study the environment of wedge for Turkish firms listed in BI.