Hardware Trojan Attacks in Analog/Mixed-Signal ICs via the Test Access Mechanism
- 1 May 2020
- conference paper
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in 2020 IEEE European Test Symposium (ETS)
Abstract
We present a Hardware Trojan (HT) attack scenario for analog circuits. The characteristic of this HT is that it does not reside inside the victim analog circuit. Instead, it resides on an independent digital circuit on the same die where it is triggered, yet its payload is applied only to the analog circuit after being transferred via the common test infrastructure and the test interface of the analog circuit. This HT attack cannot be detected or prevented in the analog domain and it exploits the dense digital circuit to hide effectively its footprint.Keywords
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