Network resilience of non-hub nodes failure under memory and non-memory based attacks with limited information

Abstract

Previous studies on network robustness mainly concentrated on hub node failures with fully known network structure information. However, hub nodes are often well protected and not accessible to damage or malfunction in a real-world networked system. In addition, one can only gain insight into limited network connectivity knowledge due to large-scale properties and dynamic changes of the network itself. In particular, two different aggression patterns are present in a network attack: memory based attack, in which failed nodes are not attacked again, or non-memory based attack; that is, nodes can be repeatedly attacked. Inspired by these motivations, we propose an attack pattern with and without memory based on randomly choosing $n$ non-hub nodes with known connectivity information. We use a network system with the Poisson and power-law degree distribution to study the network robustness after applying two failure strategies of non-hub nodes. Additionally, the critical threshold $1-p_c$ and the size of the giant component $S$ are determined for a network configuration model with an arbitrary degree distribution. The results indicate that the system undergoes a continuous second-order phase transition subject to the above attack strategies. We find that $1-p_c$ gradually tends to be stable after increasing rapidly with $n$ . Moreover, the failure of non-hub nodes with a higher degree is more destructive to the network system and makes it more vulnerable. Furthermore, from comparing the attack strategies with and without memory, the results highlight that the system shows better robustness under a non-memory based attack relative to memory based attacks for $n>1$ . Attacks with memory can block the system’s connectivity more efficiently, which has potential applications in real-world systems. Our model sheds light on network resilience under memory and non-memory based attacks with limited information attacks and provides valuable insights into designing robust real-world systems.