Rankings
Publications
Sources
Publishers
Scholars
Organizations
About
Login
Register
Home
Publications
Games with Incomplete Information: From Repetition to Cheap Talk and Persuasion
Home
Publications
Games with Incomplete Information: From Repetition to Cheap Talk and Persuasion
Games with Incomplete Information: From Repetition to Cheap Talk and Persuasion
Forges
Forges
Publisher Website
Google Scholar
Cite
Download
Share
Download
1 January 2020
journal article
Published by
JSTOR
in
Annals of Economics and Statistics
No. 137
https://doi.org/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.137.0003
Abstract
This essay aims at showing that repeated games with incomplete information, which were conceived by Aumann and Maschler in the years 1960s, provide basic tools ...
Keywords
REPETITION
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
REPEATED
TALK
1960S
AUMANN
ESSAY
MASCHLER
BASIC
Cited by 9 articles