Chapter 7 proposes transferring the role, as realist truth makers, played in ersatz presentism by abstract past times, to actual works of history, whose content , however, governed by coherentist principles, is not required to correspond with independently existing objects. Annie Thomasson’s claim that fictional works, as “humanly created abstract artefacts”, are ontologically robust enough to be realist truth makers, is extended to historical texts. Objections are answered as to how these texts, describing linear sequences of events, can be sufficiently similar to fiction to count as narrative texts, and yet sufficiently different not to count as (at best) a “sanctioned pretence”. The first answer invokes Roland Barthes, the second dismisses the implicit analogy with Gideon Rosen’s modal fictionalism which he admits is such a “pretence” in seeking to salvage the truth of a modal content which one does not believe exists. It is emphasized that only those who are, like him, realists about content must be held to realist standards of truth.