Firms' Choice of Regulatory Instruments to Reduce Pollution: A Transaction Cost Approach
- 1 December 2004
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Business and Politics
- Vol. 6 (3), 1-20
- https://doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1073
Abstract
This paper compares the economic efficiency of firm-agency governance structures for pollution reduction using transaction costs economics. Two governance structures are analyzed with the transaction costs approach: command and control regulation (CCR) and negotiated agreements (NAs). We propose that the choice of governance structure depends on the strategies firms pursue given the attributes of their transactions and their market opportunities. The application of transaction cost economics analysis leads to different choices of regulatory instruments. Firms in more mature, stable industries are likely to choose command and control, while firms in new, dynamic sectors are more likely to opt for negotiated agreements. Frequency of transactions is a key factor in firm choice.Keywords
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