Research on the Natural Hazard Emergency Cooperation Behavior between Governments and Social Organizations Based on the Hybrid Mechanism of Incentive and Linkage in China

Abstract

Social organizations have become an important component of the emergency management system by virtue of their heterogeneous resource advantages. It is of great significance to explore the interaction between the local government and social organizations and to clarify the key factors affecting the participation of social organizations in natural hazard emergency responses. With the aim of exploring the relationship between the local government and social organizations, based on evolutionary game theory, the emergency incentive game model and the emergency linkage game model of natural hazard emergency responses were constructed. The evolutionary trajectories of the emergency incentive game system and the emergency linkage game system were described by numerical simulation. Meanwhile, the influence mechanism of government decision parameters on the strategy selection of both game subjects was analyzed. The results show that both governmental incentive strategy and linkage strategy can significantly improve the enthusiasm of social organizations for participating in natural hazard emergency responses. Moreover, they could encourage social organizations to choose a positive participation strategy. Nevertheless, over-reliance on incentives reduces the probability of the local government choosing a positive emergency strategy. In addition, we found that, when both game subjects tend to choose a positive strategy, the strategy selection of the local government drives that of social organizations.