Abstract
Can the “associational revolution” improve authoritarian government responsiveness? If it can, what kind of nongovernmental organization (NGO) can successfully lobby the government? Based on different theoretical perspectives, I develop three hypotheses: a pluralist hypothesis that focuses on resource exchange between such organizations and the government, a corporatist hypothesis that focuses on government institutional control and policy consultant intention, and a clientelist hypothesis that recognizes the underinstitutionalization of the policy-making process and emphasizes the informal network. I then test these hypotheses with a quantitative study of survey data of registered NGOs in three Chinese provinces. I find that the corporatist hypothesis is strongly supported; the pluralism hypothesis is also supported while the clientelist hypothesis is rejected. The data reflect a hybrid pattern of policy advocacy that I term pluralized state corporatism, which fits China’s recent social-economic transformation and lagged political reform.
Funding Information
  • Chinese National Social Sciences Foundation (14BZZ044)

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