A performance‐based payment: Signaling the quality of a credence good
- 15 February 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 42 (5), 1117-1131
- https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3295
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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